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Changing the Culture of Disclosure and
Forensics
Valena Beety*
Abstract
This Essay responds to Professor Brandon Garrett’s
Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, and, in
particular, his identification of the dire need to change the culture
of disclosing forensic evidence. My work on forensics is—similarly
to Garrett’s—rooted in both scholarship and litigation of wrongful
convictions. From this perspective, I question whether prosecutors
fully disclose forensics findings and whether defense attorneys
understand these findings and their impact on a client’s case. To
clarify forensic findings for the entire courtroom, this Essay
suggests increased pre-trial discovery and disclosure of forensic
evidence and forensic experts. Forensic analysts largely work in
police-governed labs; therefore, this Essay also posits ways to
ensure complete Brady compliance as well as obtain accurate and
reliable forensic findings. Correctly understanding forensic
findings can remedy a lack of transparency surrounding whether
results were completely disclosed and whether the results support
the testimony of lab analysts. Finally, to assist the court with its
gate-keeping role of admitting forensic science disciplines and
findings, this Essay recommends that courts appoint independent
experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.

* Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law; Director,
West Virginia Innocence Project. Many thanks to Ed Cheng for his thoughtful
feedback on this piece and to Al Karlin and Nina Morrison for their steadfast
representation of Joseph Buffey on his path to freedom.
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“There is simply no room in our judicial system for unethical
evidentiary gamesmanship.”
- Justice Allen Hayes Loughry, Concurring in Buffey v.
Ballard1
I. Introduction
Joseph Buffey was 19 years old when, on the advice of his
attorney, he pled guilty to a rape and robbery he did not commit.2
Only afterward did he learn that the DNA evidence exonerating
him of the crime, and inculpating the true perpetrator, was
available to prosecutors at the time Joe pled guilty.3 Thirteen
years later, Joe was finally released from prison when the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled the prosecution should
have disclosed the exculpatory DNA evidence pre-trial.4
1. 782 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 2015) (Loughry, J., concurring).
2. See id. at 207–09 (describing the circumstances of Buffey’s plea
decision).
3. Id. at 209. Joseph Buffey accepted an exploding plea offer on February
6, 2002; on February 8, a lab analyst at the West Virginia State Police Crime
Lab concluded that Buffey was not the assailant. Id. at 208. On February 9, the
lab began to retest samples and came to the same conclusion. Id. The final
concluded report was issued on April 5, 2002; Mr. Buffey was sentenced six
weeks later on May 21, 2002. Id. at 209.
4. See id. at 221 (“Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court finds that
the State's failure to disclose favorable DNA test results obtained six weeks
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This small case from West Virginia is the first decision
nationally to require pre-trial disclosure of Brady material. The
criminal justice system failed Joseph Buffey. But does blame fall
on the prosecutors who failed to disclose the exculpatory DNA
evidence and violated their duties under Brady? Or does it fall on
the defense attorney who pressured Joe to take a plea deal and
never followed up on requesting the forensic results?
Professor Brandon Garrett’s piece, Constitutional Regulation
of Forensic Evidence,5 delves into a necessary cultural change:
one of disclosure. Changing the culture of disclosure of
forensics—by both the prosecution and the defense—can
establish a more trustworthy system with fewer wrongful
convictions. Garrett holds a distinguished position from which to
examine wrongful convictions and their causes with his
well-known work using data and case documentation to diagnose
the causes of wrongful convictions.6 In Constitutional Regulation
of Forensic Evidence, Garrett discusses how the Supreme Court
edges toward greater disclosure of forensic evidence, while
forensic disciplines are increasingly revealed as inaccurate or
fallible.7 In his words, forensic findings are more important to
court cases now while simultaneously recognized as less reliable.8
Garrett reasonably argues for constitutional regulation of the
disclosure of forensic evidence and due process requirements for
discovery.
This responsive Essay joins Garrett in calling for greater
disclosure and in appealing to courts for greater recognition of
faulty forensics and the barring of unreliable and inaccurate
expert testimony. Driven by my own litigation of wrongful
prior to the Petitioner's plea hearing violated the Petitioner's due process rights,
to his prejudice.”).
5. Brandon Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1147 (2016).
6. See generally BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) (reviewing the trial transcripts,
hearing transcripts, and other records of over 200 DNA exoneration cases).
7. See generally Garrett, supra note 5.
8. See id. at 1149 (“The changing judicial understanding of the
constitutional significance of forensic evidence in criminal cases may follow from
a new appreciation that forensic evidence is not only increasingly important in
criminal cases, but also that many traditional forensic techniques lack adequate
reliability and validity.”).
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convictions due to faulty forensic evidence, I ask even more of our
courtroom actors: for prosecutors to adhere to their duties of
disclosure both pre-trial under Brady and post-conviction under
Professional Responsibility Rule 3.89 and for judges to use the
tools at their disposal to ensure their own accurate
understanding of scientific evidence presented at trial. These
tools include appointing independent forensic experts under Rule
of Evidence 70610 and Jason Kreag’s recommendation of a Brady
colloquy,11 where judges ask prosecutors about their compliance
with disclosure.
II. The Supreme Court and a Necessary Cultural Change in
Disclosure
Professor Garrett identifies the necessary cultural change of
disclosure by referencing the Supreme Court’s protection—and
lack of protection—of due process rights regarding defense access
to forensic evidence.12 According to Supreme Court precedent,
there is no due process protection against destroying forensic
evidence, no due process right for a defendant to access an expert,
and, finally, no freestanding nonprocedural due process right to
DNA evidence.13 However, the Supreme Court has supported a
defendant’s right to confront lab analysts and forensic experts
and has necessitated live testimony to explain forensic lab
findings.14
As Garrett notes, the Supreme Court has also heightened the
obligations of defense counsel to litigate forensic evidence.15 In

9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion
Draft 1983) (setting forth eight separate special responsibilities of a prosecutor).
10. FED. R. EVID. 706 (providing for court-appointed experts on a party’s
motion or by the court on its own).
11. Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 47–58
(2014–2015).
12. Garrett, supra note 5, at 1156.
13. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 1148 nn.1–3 (describing shortcomings in
the due process rights of the criminally accused).
14. See id. at 1148 & n.6 (citing Williams, Bullcoming, and Melendez-Diaz,
which “tightened requirements to present live testimony in the courtroom”).
15. Id. at 1149 (citing Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081(2014)).
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Hinton v. Alabama,16 the Supreme Court chastised defense
counsel for failing to request a forensic expert, noting “criminal
cases will arise where the only reasonable and available defense
strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of
expert evidence.”17 And yet, is the back and forth—between the
failure of defense attorneys to discover forensic evidence and the
failure of prosecutors to disclose Brady evidence—ultimately
helpful to ensure disclosure and examination of forensic findings?
Garrett answers yes: defense culture is changing, and it
increasingly trains defense attorneys on forensics.18 Lower courts
identify the failure to investigate forensics or obtain experts as
ineffective assistance of counsel.19 With fewer and fewer cases
going to trial, defense counsel has a greater responsibility to
investigate forensics early in the face of a plea bargain.20 The
Supreme Court may ultimately determine that when counsel fails
to request a Daubert hearing or query forensic evidence pre-trial,
this dereliction is equally as damaging as failing to cross-examine
experts at trial. The determination that counsel is effective, or
not, is tied to “reasonableness under prevailing processional
norms,”21 and those norms are changing.
III. Prosecutors’ Ethical Obligations to Disclose
A. Prosecutorial Disclosure Pre-Trial
Prosecutorial culture, on the other hand, appears slower to
change. Professor Garrett correctly points out the failure of
prosecutors to disclose forensic discovery.22 His article also notes
that the ABA advises that full documentation from forensic labs
should be disclosed—the underlying methods and files for the

16. 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014).
17. Id. at 1088 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011)).
18. Garrett, supra note 5, at 1176.
19. See id. at 1167–70 (outlining determinations of ineffective assistance of
counsel in lower courts due to attorney errors regarding forensic evidence).
20. Id. at 1171.
21. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
22. Garrett, supra note 5, at 1180–82.
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analysis, not simply the results.23 As Garrett notes, this parallels
the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause rulings, requiring the
presence of an analyst to testify rather than the bare results of
the analysis.24 When prosecutors are the only individuals with
full access to the forensic findings and the underlying methods
and files, the same bias and tunnel vision that plagues
prosecutors in their refusal to re-examine cases post-conviction
can likewise play a detrimental role in the initial prosecution.
Our court system is now dependent on plea bargains to
function.25 As Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York
remarked, the plea bargaining system is unjust, excessive, and
“so totally untransparent it is going to lead to some serious
mistakes.”26 These mistakes have already been made: the
National Registry of Exonerations has found that 40% of people
exonerated in 2015 were convicted based on taking a guilty plea;
these cases range from drug crimes to homicides.27 One easy and
effective solution to more informed plea agreements is open casefile discovery.28 A closed-file system exacerbates timing concerns
23. Id. at 1180 n.142.
24. See generally Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305 (2009).
25. See generally Bennett Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1277 (2016) (discussing the increasingly prominent role plea bargaining
has in our criminal justice system). A substantial majority of criminal cases are
resolved by guilty pleas; thus, plea bargaining is “not some adjunct to the
criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” Missouri v. Frye, 132
S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis added).
26. Judge Jed Rakoff, S.D.N.Y., Keynote Address at the Eleventh Annual
H.F. Guggenhein Symposium at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice:
Making Room for Justice: Crime, Public Safety & the Choices Ahead for
Americans (Feb. 26, 2016); see also Adam Wisnieski, A ‘Draconian’ System
Where
the
Innocent
Plead
Guilty,
JOHN
JAY
COLLEGE,
http://thecrimereport.org/2016/02/29/2016-guggenheim-3/ (last visited Feb. 4,
2016) (reporting on Judge Rakoff’s keynote address) (on file with Washington &
Lee Law Review).
27. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015, at 1 (2016),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_201
5.pdf.
28. This was noted recently in an empirical study comparing the open-file
system of North Carolina with the closed-file system of Virginia. See Jenia I.
Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal
Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016).
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and disclosure issues by allowing prosecutors to only produce
critical evidence on the eve of, or at, trial.29
In response to wrongful convictions caused by prosecutorial
misconduct, the Texas legislature passed the Michael Morton Act
in 2013 requiring open file discovery.30 The Act requires
prosecutors to disclose any information favorable to the defense,
including exculpatory, impeaching, and mitigating evidence. This
disclosure is required “as soon as practicable” after the
prosecution receives a request, and extends even after conviction.
This Act serves as an example of open-file discovery, and its
implementation has highlighted resistance by some prosecutors
to comply. Indeed, the State Bar of Texas recently issued an
ethics opinion chastising prosecutors who attempt to circumvent
the Act by requiring defendants give up discovery rights in
exchange for a plea offer.31
Perhaps these prosecutors are concerned because in cases of
a plea agreement, the prosecutor may not have yet examined the
case as fully as she would in preparation for trial, and may not
have even discovered Brady evidence, particularly forensic
evidence.32 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 provides
prosecutors with some discovery leeway for forensics. Rule 16
only requires discovery of scientific reports and examinations if
29. See id. at 303 (describing closed-file jurisdictions). It should be noted
that in their research, even with the open-file discovery system, relevant
information is frequently missing from the file; see also Miriam H. Baer, Timing
Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2015) (“A number of state jurisdictions . . .
make the trial the ‘focal point’ of their discovery and disclosure rules.”).
30. See Brandi Grissom, Perry Signs Michael Morton Act, Tex. Tribune
(May 16, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/05/16/gov-rick-perry-signsmichael-morton-act/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (discussing the “measure that
aims to avoid wrongful convictions by preventing prosecutors from suppressing
evidence”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See TEXAS APPLESEED, TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE v (2015),
http://texasdefender.org/wpcontent/uploads/Towards_More_Transparent_Justice.pdf (reporting that some
prosecutors require “that defendants waive the right to discovery in exchange
for a favorable plea, or that defendants forfeit other rights in exchange for
accessing discovery”). The State Bar found that these “waivers” violate the
Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.
32. See Baer, supra note 29, at 44 (“If ninety-five percent of the defendant
pool pleads guilty, then resource-deprived prosecutors should rationally delay
some of their preparation for trial until they know for sure whether a given
defendant plans to plead not guilty.”).
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such evidence “is material to preparing the defense” or “the
government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial.”33
At the time of a plea, a prosecutor may only have given a cursory
glance at crime lab results.
The expectation of prosecutors is changing. Joseph Buffey’s
case is particularly instructive as the first coherent opinion
requiring Brady disclosure of exculpatory—not impeachment—
evidence during plea negotiations before trial.34 While the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled impeachment evidence does not need to
be disclosed in plea negotiations,35 the Court has not ruled on
exculpatory evidence. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals ruled that the constitutional due process rights in Brady
extend to the plea negotiation stage of criminal proceedings.36
The Court found “that the DNA results were favorable,
suppressed, and material”; thus nondisclosure violated Buffey’s
due process rights and was prejudicial.37 In Justice Loughry’s
concurrence, he stated that Brady disclosure requirements
“extend to evidence in the State’s control that is favorable to the
defendant regardless of whether a plea agreement or trial
ensues.”38 Furthermore, the Court found that the evidence does
not need to be exonerative, and the standard for materiality “does
not require a demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure
of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the
defendant’s acquittal.”39

33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F)(iii).
34. Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 212–18 (2015) (examining the
applicability of Brady to the plea negotiation stage).
35. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002) (“Although the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments provide, as part of the Constitution’s ‘fair trial’
guarantee, that defendants have the right to receive exculpatory impeachment
material from prosecutors, . . . a defendant who pleads guilty foregoes a fair trial
as well as various other accompanying constitutional guarantees.” (internal
citation omitted)).
36. Buffey, 782 S.E.2d at 218.
37. See id. (“We find that the DNA results were favorable, suppressed, and
material to the defense. Thus, the Petitioner's due process rights, as enunciated
in Brady, were violated by the State's suppression of that exculpatory
evidence.”).
38. Id. at 221 (Loughry, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 212 (majority opinion).
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B. Prosecutorial Ethical Obligations Post-Conviction

When discussing prosecutorial disclosure, prosecutors face a
different ethical standard than defense attorneys. Prosecutors do
not represent an individual client; rather, they represent the
state and the government. The duty of a prosecutor is to ensure
justice, even if that means “losing” an individual case. Under the
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8:
[A] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice
and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the
basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are
taken to prevent and rectify the conviction of innocent
persons.40

This responsibility requires disclosure of evidence that helps a
defendant and undermines the state’s case.
In 2008, the ABA amended Rule 3.8 to affirmatively require
a prosecutor to disclose evidence of a defendant’s innocence found
after the conviction.41 A minister of justice seeks the truth
whether before or after a conviction. And yet while the fear of
wrongful convictions has galvanized defense attorneys to
advocate more robustly for clients and has led courts to chastise a
lack of defense, prosecutors often remain planted all the more
firmly in their original positions. Instead of “seek[ing] to remedy

40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
41. Id. at r. 3.8:
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence
creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not
commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the
prosecutor shall: (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate
court or authority, and (2) if the conviction was obtained in the
prosecutor’s jurisdiction, (i) promptly disclose that evidence to the
defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and (ii) undertake further
investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to
determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the
defendant did not commit.
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence
establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was
convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the
prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.
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the conviction,”42 prosecutors challenge the testing of DNA
evidence, argue against its relevancy, and often re-bring charges
if a conviction is reversed in court. Indeed, less than half the
states have adopted—or even considered—Rule 3.8 (g) and (h) for
state law.43 Prosecutors proclaim the amendments are insulting
and resent the insinuation of poor behavior.
Insinuations? In Joseph Buffey’s case, prosecutors re-filed
the exact same charges as soon as the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals vacated them—even after they had prosecuted
and convicted the true perpetrator, identified by DNA, of the
same single-assailant crime.44 Instead of following Rule 3.8’s
admonition that “guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence” and that prosecutors are obliged to “rectify the
conviction of innocent persons,” prosecutors in Clarksburg, West
Virginia,45 convicted the true perpetrator, Adam Bowers, of this
single-assailant crime46 and then re-charged Buffey with the
same assault. Additionally, prosecutors charged Joe with
statutory rape from 2002 because as a 19-year-old he fathered a
child with his then 14-year-old girlfriend.47 To avoid being
registered as a sex offender for life, Joe took an Alford plea48 to
42.
43.

Id. at r. 3.8(h).
See CPR Policy Implementation Committee Report: Rule 3.8(g) and (h),
AM
BAR
ASS’N
(Sept.
1,
2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_respo
nsibility/mrpc_3_8_g_h.authcheckdam.pdf.
44. See Joseph Buffey Agrees to Plea Deal, Freed After 15 Years in Prison,
CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL
(Oct.
11,
2016),
http://www.wvgazettemail.com/news-cops-and-courts/20161011/joseph-buffeyagrees-to-plea-deal-freed-after-15-years-in-prison [hereinafter GAZETTE-MAIL]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (reporting on Buffey’s Kennedy plea in response to the
renewed charges) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. Specifically, these prosecutors were David Romano and Cindy Romano,
Harrison County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney.
46. Clarksburg Man Sentenced After Raping and Robbing 83-Year-Old
Woman,
12
NEWS-WBOY
(Sept.
2,
2015),
http://www.wvalways.com/story/29946684/clarksburg-man-sentenced-afterraping-and-robbing-83-year-old-woman (last updated Sept. 14, 2015) (last
visited Feb. 4, 2017) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. GAZETTE-MAIL, supra note 44.
48. An Alford plea, known in West Virginia as a Kennedy plea, is where the
defendant does not concede guilt but instead concedes the state would have
enough evidence to find him guilty. For the genesis of this sort of plea
agreement, see generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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the original crime he did not commit, and the state dropped the
statutory rape charge. Thirteen years after his original
conviction, Joseph Buffey pled guilty49—again—to a crime he did
not commit on October 11, 2016. In his own words, he told the
court he did not commit the crime, but thought it was in his best
interest to plead guilty.50 As is often the case in these
re-prosecutions, the prosecutors asked only for a sentence of time
served.
Professor Keith Findley has documented the accompanying
“time served” plea offer to re-brought charges, usually for
particularly heinous and memorable crimes.51 Do even the
prosecutors believe the person they re-charged committed the
crime if they are allowing a perpetrator to be free on the streets?
Yet prosecutors can be reluctant to consent even to DNA testing
to determine if the convicted person is truly guilty. Although
courts are increasingly receptive to allowing DNA testing to
determine the true perpetrator, prosecutors continue to oppose it.
In Charles “Manny” Kilmer’s case,52 although the FBI
admitted to its analyst falsely testifying and offered free DNA
testing to rectify this false testimony, the local state prosecutor
objected to the testing. Are the people of West Virginia and the
citizens of that county well represented when their ministers of
justice insist on expending significant state resources to seek an
49. Mike Valentine, Joseph Buffey Enters Alford Plea, Walks Free, 5 NEWS
WDTV.COM
(Oct.
11,
2016
11:43
AM),
http://www.wdtv.com/content/news/Charges-dismissed-against-Joseph-Buffey-396651991.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
50. GAZETTE-MAIL, supra note 44.
51. Keith Findley, Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin
School of Law, Reconvicting the Innocent? Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of a
New Trial (Nov. 21, 2015).
52. As we said in our brief in support of Manny Kilmer:
There is no possible downside to allowing the FBI to perform DNA
testing at zero cost to the State of West Virginia. There is certainly a
downside to continuing to try to prevent a seventy-one-year-old man
who has asserted his innocence for the past two-and-a-half decades
from obtaining DNA testing, especially in light of the Circuit Court of
Berkeley County’s order granting testing and the FBI’s offer to
provide testing.
Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Kilmer v. Ballard,
No. 15-C-351 (W. Va. 2016).
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extraordinary remedy to fight against DNA testing that the FBI
has offered to perform at absolutely no cost to the state?
Manny Kilmer was convicted in 1991 of murdering Sharon
Lewis in Martinsburg, West Virginia. His case involves a coerced
confession, a snitch, poor lawyering, and improper forensic
science exacerbated by false scientific testimony.53
If the
prosecuting attorneys are as confident as they profess that
Manny perpetrated the murder of Sharon Lewis, then the FBI
has offered them a way to confirm, once and for all, the integrity
of the conviction. On the other hand, if there is any doubt
whether the right person was convicted, a prosecutor would
presumably be eager to allow the FBI to perform DNA testing to
correct a manifest injustice. The prosecutors are unable to
explain how allowing DNA testing could cause harm to the state.
Opposing testing not only disregards the prosecutor’s duty as a
minister of justice, it also wastes valuable state resources.
In summary, prosecutors hold a duty to disclose evidence of
innocence under Rule 3.8 and also to serve as ministers of justice
rather than simply as advocates. Their duty to uphold justice
extends after a conviction, particularly when evidence exposes a
wrongful conviction. The disclosure of forensic evidence is key to
an accurate conviction and to upholding the requirements of the
position as prosecuting attorney.
IV. Solutions for Judges
Professor Garrett’s timely piece discussing the culture of
disclosure coincides with a recent report by the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)
questioning the reliability of certain forensic disciplines.54 The
report, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific
Validity
of
Feature-Comparison
Methods,
made
eight
recommendations for the FBI, the Attorney General, the
53.
54.

See generally id. (describing what had happened to Kilmer).
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC
VALIDITY
OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON
METHODS
(2016)
[hereinafter
STRENGTHENING],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_fore
nsic_science_report_final.pdf.
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judiciary, and science-based agencies. These recommendations
emphasized the need for objective analysis and empirical
research on the accuracy and consistency of forensic results, the
challenging duty of the court to evaluate expert testimony, and
the need for established standards for validity and reliability in
forensic science disciplines.55 The forensic disciplines receiving
the most focus in the Report are bite marks, fingerprints,
firearms, mixture samples of DNA, and footwear. PCAST was
particularly concerned—as was the National Academy of Sciences
in their 2009 report on forensics56—with independent scientists
providing analyses rather than police labs and the gate-keeping
role of judges in admitting reliable evidence. To assist judges in
this role, PCAST recommended “best practices” and training
materials for judges on understanding scientific standards for
validity. The Attorney General and the FBI—the prosecutors and
the police—rejected PCAST’s recommendations.57
I suggest that courts appoint independent experts to evaluate
forensic evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. While this
has been rarely done, an independent expert can assist judges in
their gate-keeping role, particularly with ongoing changes in
science. In Jackson v. Pollion,58 a the Seventh Circuit prisoner
health case, Judge Richard Posner suggests the same and
lambasts the legal profession to “get over its fear and loathing of
science.”59 Under Rule 706, parties may submit nominations and
the court may on its own motion appoint an expert.60
55. Indeed, the Report closely tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 702
requirements on admitting experts.
56. NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED
STATES:
A
PATH
FORWARD
(2009),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf
[hereinafter
Strengthening].
57. White House Advisory Council Report is Critical of Forensics Used in
Criminal Trials: U.S. Attorney General says Justice Department won’t Adopt
Recommendations, WALL ST. J. (last updated Sept. 20, 2016, 4:25 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-advisory-council-releases-reportcritical-of-forensics-used-in-criminal-trials-1474394743 (last visited Feb. 4,
2017) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. 733 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013).
59. Id. at 790; see also id. at 788 (noting that “[t]he discomfort of the legal
profession, including the judiciary, with science and technology is not a new
phenomenon”).
60. FED. R. EVID. 706(A).
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Furthermore, this court appointment of an expert does not
prevent the parties from calling their own experts, should they
choose to do so.61 Because judges have an obligation under
Daubert to act as gatekeepers to exclude invalid science, a Rule
706 impartial court-appointed expert would assist in judges
fulfilling that duty. Indeed, in a concurrence to General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, Justice Breyer recommended that “[j]udges should
be strongly encouraged to make greater use of their inherent
authority . . . to appoint experts . . . . Reputable experts could be
recommended to courts by established scientific organizations,
such as the National Academy of Sciences or the American
Association for the Advancement of Science.”62 But, twenty years
later, district courts remain largely reluctant to use these tools.
An independent expert appointed by a judge, with equal
access to the expert for all courtroom actors, may ensure more
accurate results and more complete documentation, particularly
if labs remain entrenched in police departments. The lack of
independent crime labs is an ongoing issue, seven years after the
National Academy of Sciences recommended crime labs be
removed from police control.63
A final suggestion particular to disclosure, put forward by
Professor Jason Kreag, is for courts to routinely ask prosecutors if
they have disclosed Brady evidence pre-trial.64 In this “Brady
colloquy,” the judge questions the prosecutor about her
compliance with disclosure on the record. Some prosecutors
refute the idea of a Brady colloquy, insisting that this questioning
is demeaning, and they are insulted by the inference of not
complying with their duties.65 The reality of opposition to DNA
61. FED. R. EVID. 706(E).
62. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (quoting Brief for New England Journal of Medicine, 18–19). Breyer
also recommended judges use a range of tools to make determinations about
scientific evidence, and “[a]mong these techniques are an increased use of Rule
16’s pretrial conference authority to narrow the scientific issues in dispute,
pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject to examination by the
court, and the appointment of special masters and specially trained law clerks.”
Id. at 146.
63. See STRENGTHENING, supra note 56.
64. See generally Kreag, supra note 11.
65. See Radley Balko, Judge Says Prosecutors Should Follow Law.
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testing, re-filing debunked charges, and retributive actions
against defendants who have been proven innocent lessen the
alleged insult of these questions, in my opinion. Even Judge
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has opined, “There is an epidemic of
Brady violations abroad in the land . . . only judges can put a stop
to it.”66 A Brady colloquy is yet another tool for judges to ensure
accurate disclosure, the first step to admitting accurate forensics
in the courtroom.
V. Conclusion
Professor Garrett is correct in recognizing the need for a
cultural change in disclosure of forensic evidence and greater
responsibility placed on not simply the defense but also on the
prosecution to present accurate evidence.
Ultimately, all courtroom players need to own a sense of
responsibility to act and to ensure valid and reliable forensic
evidence is presented in the courtroom and that these forensic
findings are disclosed to defendants. All courtroom players can
and need to work to exonerate the innocent and prevent their
wrongful convictions in the first place.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/03/07/judge-saysprosecutors-should-follow-the-law-prosecutors-revolt (last visited Feb. 4, 2017)
(“In a debate a couple of weeks ago, [Maricopa County Attorney William]
Montgomery reiterated his opposition. He said he already follows the rule, and
so he was insulted that anyone would suggest an ethical guideline would be
necessary to hold him to it.”) (on file with Washington & Lee Law Review).
66. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).

